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Abstract
This chapter surveys the new institutional economics, a rapidly growing
literature combining economics, law, organization theory, political science,
sociology and anthropology to understand social, political and commercial
institutions. This literature tries to explain what institutions are, how they arise,
what purposes they serve, how they change and how they may be reformed.
Following convention, I distinguish between the institutional environment (the
background constraints, or ‘rules of the game’, that guide individuals’
behavior) and institutional arrangements (specific guidelines designed by
trading partners to facilitate particular exchanges). In both cases, the discussion
here focuses on applications, evidence and policy implications.
JEL classification: D23, D72, L22, L42, O17
Keywords: Institutions, Firms, Transaction Costs, Specific Assets, Governance
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1. Introduction
The new institutional economics (NIE) is an interdisciplinary enterprise
combining economics, law, organization theory, political science, sociology and
anthropology to understand the institutions of social, political and commercial
life. It borrows liberally from various social-science disciplines, but its primary
language is economics. Its goal is to explain what institutions are, how they
arise, what purposes they serve, how they change and how - if at all - they
should be reformed. This essay surveys the wide-ranging and rapidly growing
literature on the economics of institutions, with an emphasis on applications
and evidence. The survey is divided into eight sections: the institutional
environment; institutional arrangements and the theory of the firm; moral
hazard and agency; transaction cost economics; capabilities and the core
competence of the firm; evidence on contracts, organizations and institutions;
public policy implications and influence; and a brief summary.
Until recently, ‘institutional economics’ usually referred to the writings of
Thorstein Veblen, John R. Commons, Wesley C. Mitchell, Clarence Ayres and
their followers. This is a diverse group, but their work reflects several common
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themes, mostly criticisms of orthodox economics: (1) a focus on collective
rather than individual action; (2) a preference for an ‘evolutionary’ rather than
mechanistic approach to the economy; and (3) an emphasis on empirical
observation over deductive reasoning. (For a sampling of the secondary
literature see Seckler, 1975; Gruchy, 1972; Gruchy, 1987; Rutherford, 1983;
Langlois, 1989; and Hodgson, 1998. On the German roots of American
institutionalism, see Richter, 1996.) Whatever their contributions, the older
institutionalists are little known to most contemporary economists. Coase’s
(1984, p. 230) dismissal is typical: ‘Without a theory they had nothing to pass
on except a mass of descriptive material waiting for a theory, or a fire’. Still,
this tradition (broadly defined) continues in such outlets as the Journal of
Economic Issues, the Cambridge Journal of Economics and the Review of
Political Economy.
The term ‘new institutional economics’ was originated by Williamson
(1975). NIE, which began to develop as a self-conscious movement in the
1970s, traces its origins to Coase’s analysis of the firm (Coase, 1937), Hayek’s
writings on knowledge (Hayek, 1937, 1945) and Chandler’s history of
industrial enterprise (Chandler, 1962), along with contributions by Simon
(1947), Arrow (1963), Davis and North (1971), Williamson (1971, 1975,
1985),  Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Macneil (1978), Holmström (1979) and
others. Its best-known representatives are Coase, Williamson and North. For
overviews and commentaries see Eggertsson (1990), Furubotn and Richter
(1991), Coase (1992), Werin and Wijkander (1992), Pejovich (1995), Drobak
and Nye (1997); and annual symposium issues of the Journal of Institutional
and Theoretical Economics.
Like its older counterpart, the new institutional economics is interested in
the social, economic and political institutions that govern everyday life.
However, the new institutional economics eschews the holism of the older
school. NIE follows strict methodological individualism, always couching its
explanations in terms of the goals, plans and actions of individuals. Of course,
NIE appreciates social phenomena like corporate culture, organizational
memory, and so on. Still, NIE takes these as explananda, not the explanans.
NIE differs from mainstream neoclassical economics, however, in insisting
that policy analysis be guided by what Coase (1964) calls ‘comparative
institutional analysis’. Orthodox welfare analysis typically compares real-world
outcomes with the hypothetical benchmark of perfectly competitive general
equilibrium. It is unsurprising, then, that actual market outcomes will come up
short. The relevant question, Coase explains, is whether a feasible alternative
can be devised:
Contemplation of an optimal system may provide techniques of analysis that would
otherwise have been missed and, in certain special cases, it may go far to providing
a solution. But in general its influence has been pernicious. It has directed
economists’ attention away from the main question, which is how alternative
arrangements will actually work in practice. It has led economists to derive
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conclusions for economic policy from a study of an abstract of a market situation.
It is no accident that in the literature ... we find a category ‘market failure’ but no
category ‘government failure’. Until we realize that we are choosing between social
arrangements which are all more or less failures, we are not likely to make much
headway. (Coase, 1964, p. 195)
Coase’s own investigation of British lighthouses (Coase, 1974) is a
well-known comparative-institutional study. Coase discovered that before the
1830s, the typical British lighthouse - the classic, textbook example of a ‘public
good’, which presumably the market cannot supply and therefore the state must
provide - was privately owned and operated. Coase pointed out that here, public
ownership does not overcome the ‘free-rider problem’ any better than does
private ownership. Thus we should not be surprised to see private entrepreneurs
providing this public good - at least until it was nationalized and provided
thereafter by the state. (For other examples of public goods that were privately
provided, but later nationalized - typically to raise revenue for the sovereign -
see Benson, 1994 on police services and public highways, Benson, 1992 on
criminal law and Selgin and White, forthcoming on money.)
To organize the various strands of the NIE, it is useful to begin with Davis
and North’s (1971) distinction between the ‘institutional environment’ and
‘institutional arrangements’. The former refers to the background constraints,
or ‘rules of the game’, that guide individuals’ behavior. These can be both
formal, explicit rules (constitutions, laws, property rights) and informal, often
implicit rules (social conventions, norms). While these background rules are
the product of - and can be explained in terms of - the goals, beliefs and choices
of individual actors, the social result (the rule itself) is typically not known or
‘designed’ by anyone. Institutional arrangements, by contrast, are specific
guidelines - what Williamson (1985, 1996b) calls ‘governance structures’ -
designed by trading partners to mediate particular economic relationships.
Business firms, long-term contracts, public bureaucracies, nonprofit
organizations and other contractual agreements are examples of institutional
arrangements.
2. The Institutional Environment
The institutional environment forms the framework in which human action
takes place. ‘Institutions reduce uncertainty by providing a structure to
everyday life’, writes North (1990, p. 3). ‘In the jargon of the economist,
institutions define and limit the set of choices of individuals. Institutional
constraints include both what individuals are prohibited from doing and,
sometimes, under what conditions some individuals are permitted to undertake
certain activities. ... They are perfectly analogous to the rules of the game in a
competitive team sport’ (North, 1990, pp. 3-4). Unlike the rules in team sports,
however, these guidelines often arise ‘spontaneously’, as by-products of
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individual choices, rather than deliberately through collective action (Hayek,
1967, 1973).
The Legal Environment and Property Rights
Of these sets of rules, the legal environment has received the most attention.
Economists have long been interested in the economic effects of laws (for
instance, the effects of a price ceiling on equilibrium price and quantity), but
only in the last few decades has economics been applied to the design of legal
rules and the legal system itself. Beginning with the early literature on the
efficiency of the common law (Rubin, 1977; Priest, 1977), economics has been
used to study not only the character and effects of law but the mechanisms by
which legal rules change. In this sense, law and economics may therefore be
considered a part of NIE, although it is customary to speak of law and
economics and NIE as separate movements. (See the exchange between Posner,
1993, and Williamson, 1993, for contrasting views on the relationship between
these two literatures.  See also Williamson, 1996c, on the relationship between
NIE and legal realism.)
NIE has been particularly interested in contract law (Llewellyn, 1931;
Macneil, 1974, 1978; Langbein, 1987) and property law (Alchian, 1961;
Demsetz, 1967; Furubotn and Pejovich, 1972, 1974; De Alessi, 1980; Barzel,
1989). However, unlike the ‘legal centralism’ tradition, which holds that
disputes are primarily settled by the courts as official agents of the state, NIE
often focuses on private solutions, holding that ‘in many instances the
participants can devise more satisfactory solutions to their disputes than can
professionals constrained to apply general rules on the basis of limited
knowledge of the dispute’ (Galanter, 1981, p. 4). The recent studies on
decentralized law and its evolution by Benson (1990), Ellickson (1991) and
Cooter (1994), for example, are examples of this ‘private ordering’ tradition.
Norms and Social Conventions
Equally important are the informal and often tacit, rules that structure social
conduct. ‘[F]ormal rules ... make up a small ... part of the sum of constraints
that shape choices; ... the governing structure is overwhelmingly defined by
codes of conduct, norms of behavior and conventions’ (North, 1990, p. 36). 
Such rules, once established, form constraints for individual actors. Yet how
can the rules themselves be explained in terms of purposeful individual
choices? In Menger’s (1883, p. 146) words: ‘How can it be that institutions
which serve the common welfare and are extremely significant for its
development come into being without a common will directed toward
establishing them?’
One approach is to interpret social conventions as noncooperative
Nash-equilibrium solutions to a variety of repeated games (‘supergames’) faced
by individuals in social settings. An example is the coordination game made
famous by Schelling (1960). Two friends arrange to meet one day at 5:00 p.m.
in New York City. As the time of the meeting approaches, however, neither can
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remember where the meeting was to take place. Furthermore, the friends cannot
contact each other to verify the location of the meeting; each must guess,
independently, a likely meeting place. What can they do? Obviously, this game
has multiple Nash equilibria: any outcome in which both friends choose the
same location - say, the corner of 34th Street and 5th Avenue - is a Nash
equilibrium to the game. According to Schelling, when faced with this kind of
problem, agents rely on cultural information outside the structure of the game.
Everyone simply knows, for example, that the logical place to meet in New
York City is beneath the clock in the main terminal of Grand Central Station.
This equilibrium is what Schelling called a ‘focal point.’ Over time, he argued,
behavioral regularities develop so agents can solve these kinds of coordination
problems.
Ullman-Margalit (1977) calls these equilibria ‘norms’; Sugden (1986) calls
them ‘conventions’; Schotter (1981) calls them ‘social institutions’. In
Schotter’s (1981, p. 11) words, a social institution is ‘a regularity in social
behavior that is agreed to by all members of society, specifies behavior in
specific recurrent situations and is either self-policed or policed by some
external authority’. These regularities are presumed to arise over time as agents
interact repeatedly. Game theory itself, however, usually says little about how
a particular convention is chosen; it only identifies combinations of strategies
that are mutual best responses. More recently, some explicitly evolutionary
models (Witt, 1989; Wärnereyd, 1990; Boyer and Orlean, 1992) have tried to
explain the dynamic process by which particular equilibria are chosen. Axelrod
(1984) has shown experimentally that strategies of repeated cooperation tend
to be established relatively quickly.
Ellickson (1991) explains that social norms, as ‘customary law’, can be
superior to administrative or judicial dispute resolution among people with
close social ties. Ellickson studied disputes between cattle ranchers and farmers
in Shasta County, California and found that these disputes were usually
resolved by appeal to generally accepted social rules, not by bargaining over
legal rights (as the Coase Theorem would predict). ‘[M]embers of a close-knit
group develop and maintain norms whose content serves to maximize the
aggregate welfare that members obtain in their workaday affairs with one
another’ (Ellickson, 1991, p. 167). That is, through repeated play, agents tend
to converge on strategies of cooperation that improve joint well being. These
strategies replace traditional legal remedies. ‘Law solves the problem of
cooperation by altering the payoff structure in each game; relationships solve
the problem by repeating the game. In Shasta County, where both solutions are
available, relationships prevail over law’ (Cooter, 1993, p. 423). Informal
norms, in these cases, replace law.
Norms and law are not necessarily substitutes, however. Law can shape the
outcome of private bargaining by serving as a backup mechanism for resolving
disputes that cannot be resolved privately. If the alternative to private dispute
resolution is resolution in court, then the expected outcome at trial determines
the parties’ ‘threat values’ in bargaining. Bargaining typically takes place ‘in
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the shadow of the law’ (Cooter, Marks and Mnookin, 1982). Moreover, norms
can help shape the law, if judges look to social norms as guidelines for legal
decisions. The traditional account of the medieval law merchant illustrates this
phenomenon. During the commercial revolution merchants developed a system
of private courts to resolve disputes among themselves. The rules of these
courts became general merchant practice, enforced by the threat of ostracism.
As the English legal system developed, judges began to hear commercial
disputes once handled privately. In resolving these disputes, English
common-law judges tended to enforce the merchant customs already in place.
In this way the common law came to embody the principles that already
existed, principles developed through private interaction among merchants.
(On the law merchant see Trakman, 1983 and Benson, 1989). Today, many
commercial disputes are resolved privately, through organizations such as the
VISA Arbitration Committee (Solove, 1986; Cooter, 1994).
Economic History and Economic Growth
Attention to the institutional environment has become increasingly common in
economic history and it has deeply enriched our understanding of how
economies develop through time (North and Thomas, 1973; North, 1990;
Drobak and Nye, 1997). Economic development is no longer regarded as a
gradual, inevitable transformation from local autarky to specialization and the
division of labor. Instead, development is seen as a response to the evolution of
institutions that support social and commercial relationships. Economic growth
thus depends on the degree to which the potential hazards of trade (shirking,
opportunism and the like) can be controlled by institutions, which reduce
information costs, encourage capital formation and capital mobility, allow risks
to be priced and shared and otherwise facilitate cooperation.
In early societies, agency problems were typically solved through kinship
or other close social ties. Greif (1989), for example, has shown how
eleventh-century Jewish traders in the Mediterranean trade enforced codes of
conduct by maintaining close social relationships, using the threat of ostracism
as a disciplinary device. Later, standardized weights and measures, units of
account, media of exchange and procedures to resolve disputes (such as
merchant law courts) supported the expansion of trade by lowering information
costs. Capital markets could flourish only in societies where rulers could
credibly commit not to expropriate private wealth; North and Weingast (1989)
show how capital markets emerged in Britain after the Glorious Revolution of
1688 placed parliamentary limits on the authority of the Crown. The growth of
product and factor markets depends similarly on establishing secure property
rights. Furthermore, as an economy industrializes, more and more commercial
activity involves ‘transacting’: trade, finance, banking, insurance and
management (Wallis and North, 1986). Industrialization requires institutions
to mitigate the costs associated with these transactions.
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Economic development, then, is institutional development. ‘The central
issue of economic history and of economic development is to account for the
evolution of political and economic institutions that create an economic
environment that induces increasing productivity’ (North, 1991, p. 98).
Positive Political Theory
Political institutions have also received much attention in NIE. The
rational-choice approach to politics, as outlined in public choice (Buchanan and
Tullock, 1962; Mueller, 1979, 1989) and positive political theory (McKelvey,
1976; Riker, 1981; Enelow and Hinich, 1984), holds that political institutions
can be explained in terms of purposeful human choice. This framework has
been applied to constitutions, legislatures, executives, bureaucracies, courts and
elections. Spatial models of voting, for example, show how different voting
rules (such as which party can set the agenda) affect the outcome. Among the
better-known applications of the spatial model are studies of the committee
structure in Congress, under which committees have agenda-setting power
(Denzau and Mackay, 1983; Shepsle and Weingast, 1987). The rational-choice
perspective is also used to explain the effects of political institutions on public
policy, including macroeconomic policy, welfare policy, budgets, regulation
and technology policy (see Weingast, 1996, for an overview).
Why, however, do political institutions take one form or another? One
approach is to identify particular political institutions that are self-perpetuating,
meaning that those individuals or groups which can modify the institution have
no incentive to do so (Ordeshook, 1993; Weingast, 1995). Antebellum
American federalism is one example; it survived, arguably, because it was
supported by institutions such as the territorial ‘balance rule’ established by the
Missouri Compromise of 1820 (Weingast, 1994). Another approach identifies
institutions that allow bureaucrats to make their policy choices last beyond their
own tenures (Moe, 1989).
Complexity and Cognitive Science
A few recent papers have focused on the relationship between the institutional
environment and cognitive processes in forming a framework for decision
making under uncertainty (Denzau and North, 1994; Clark, 1997). Denzau and
North (1994) argue that ideology, along with institutions, helps agents cope
with complex decisions. They define ideology as a shared set of mental models
possessed by groups of individuals. These mental models are ‘the internal
representations that individual cognitive systems create to interpret the
environment’; institutions are ‘the external (to the mind) mechanisms
individuals create to structure and order the environment’ (Denzau and North,
1994, p. 4). Together, ideology and institutions form a framework for economic
activity under conditions of uncertainty. If social learning is path-dependent,
as they maintain, then economic development will be gradual and uneven. This
may explain why some economies continue to perform poorly for long periods.
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3. Institutional Arrangements and the Theory of the Firm
These rules and customs that make up the institutional environment are
primarily economy-side phenomena. Another aspect of the new institutional
economics focuses on agreements made by specific individuals to govern their
own relationships. Such institutional arrangements - what Williamson (1996b,
p. 5) calls the institutions of governance - include contracts and organizations
and in particular, the business firm. The study of governance is more prosaic
than the study of the institutional environment. ‘Mundane questions of whether
to make or buy a component to be used in the manufacture of an automobile or
whether to expand the hospital into outpatient and home health services are
ones that arise at the level of governance. By contrast, composite economic
growth and income distribution are more apt to be the objects of interest in an
inquiry into the institutional environment’ (Williamson, 1996b, p. 5). However,
the study of governance - in particular, the theory of the firm - is arguably more
developed than the study of the institutional environment.
Coase once described his 1937 paper on the firm as ‘much cited and little
used’ (Coase, 1972, p. 56). Today, the theory of the firm is one of the
fastest-growing areas in applied microeconomics. For overviews of the modern
theory of the firm, see Holmström and Tirole (1989), Milgrom and Roberts
(1992), Radner (1992), Holmström and Milgrom (1994), Hart (1995) and
Buckley and Michie (1996). For critiques and alternative perspectives see
Langlois and Robertson (1995) and Foss (1997).
The Conventional Theory of The Firm
What economists usually mean by ‘the theory of the firm’ is the theory of
production, not the theory of the firm as a legal entity. In economics textbooks,
the ‘firm’ is a production function or production possibilities set, a ‘black box’
that transforms inputs into outputs. Given technology, input prices and a
demand schedule, the firm maximizes money profits subject to the constraint
that its production plans must be technologically feasible. The firm is modeled
as a single actor, facing a series of straightforward decisions: what level of
output to produce, how much of each factor to hire, and so on. Similarly, the
firm’s size and product range are usually explained in terms of production
costs: economies of scale imply larger firms, while economies of scope justify
the multiproduct firm (Spulber, 1989, pp. 113-20).
The conventional theory has proved highly useful for understanding pricing
and output decisions and how these vary with competitive conditions. It also
has the appeal of analytical tractability along with its elegant parallel to
neoclassical consumer theory (profit maximization is like utility maximization,
isoquants are indifference curves, and so on). However, the production-function
approach provides little insight into the boundaries of the firm. For example,
cost subadditivity (as reflected in economies of scale and scope) implies that
certain quantities of output can be produced more efficiently when they are
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produced together. Yet this does not explain why the joint production must take
place in a single firm; absent transactional difficulties, two independent firms
could simply contract to share the same plant or facility and jointly produce the
efficient level of output (Teece, 1980, 1982). Whether the firms will integrate
thus depends on the cost of writing and enforcing contracts, not only on the
underlying productive technology.
The black-box model is really a theory about a plant or production process,
not a firm. Textbook treatments frequently blur the distinction between firm
and plant (for a welcome exception, see Sharkey, 1982, pp. 73-83), but the two
are quite distinct. A single firm can own and operate multiple production
processes, just as two or more firms can contract to operate jointly a single
production process (as in a research joint venture). For this reason, the
production-function approach cannot fully explain such real-world business
practices as vertical and lateral integration, acquisitions, geographic and
product-line diversification, franchising, long-term commercial contracting,
transfer pricing and joint ventures, nor is it an adequate guide for antitrust and
regulatory policy. Instead, the new institutional economics sees the firm as a set
of arrangements - as an organization - itself worthy of economic analysis.
Coase and Transaction Costs
The new institutional approach to the firm is usually traced to Coase’s
celebrated 1937 paper on ‘The Nature of the Firm’. Coase was the first to
explain that the boundaries of the organization depend not only on the
productive technology, but on the costs of transacting business. In the Coasian
framework, as developed and expanded by Williamson (1975, 1985, 1996b),
Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and
Moore (1990), the decision to organize transactions within the firm as opposed
to on the open market - the ‘make or buy decision’ - depends on the relative
costs of internal and external exchange. The market mechanism entails certain
costs: discovering the relevant prices, negotiating and enforcing contracts, and
so on. Within the firm, the entrepreneur can reduce these ‘transaction costs’ by
coordinating these activities himself. However, internal organization brings
another kind of transaction costs, namely problems of information flows,
incentives, monitoring and performance evaluation. More generally, all feasible
modes of economic organization incur costs. The nature of the firm, then, is
determined by the relative costs of organizing transactions under alternative
institutional arrangements.
This transformation of economists’ thinking about the firm is nicely
summarized by Roe (1994, p. vii):
Economic theory once treated the firm as a collection of machinery, technology,
inventory, workers and capital. Dump these inputs into a black box, stir them up and
one got outputs of products and profits. Today, theory sees the firm as more, as a
management structure. The firm succeeds if managers can successfully coordinate
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the firm’s activities; it fails if managers cannot effectively coordinate and match 
people and inputs to current technologies and markets. At the very top of the firm
are the relationships among the firm’s shareholders, its directors and its senior
managers. If those relationships are dysfunctional, the firm is more likely to
stumble.
With this new orientation, economic theory is playing an increasingly
visible role in finance, accounting, management and other areas once thought
to be beyond the purview of economics.
4. Moral Hazard and Agency
The modern theory of the firm comprises several approaches. The moral-hazard
or agency-theoretic approach begins with Berle and Means’s (1932)
identification of the ‘separation of ownership and control’ in the large firm.
The modern corporation, they claimed, is run not by owners (shareholders), but
by salaried managers, whose goals often differ from those of the owners.
Managers may use their discretion to ‘shirk’ or otherwise pursue personal
objectives (firm growth, personal power, entrenchment, perquisites) at the
expense of shareholder value.
The Berle-Means account omits the possibility that competition might
impose discipline on shirking managers. Product-market competition,
competition in the internal market for managers (Fama, 1980) and competition
in the market for corporate control (Manne, 1965) all place limits on
managerial discretion. Still, their basic model of conflict between shareholders
and managers - what we would now call a principal-agent problem - remains
a powerful lens for viewing the internal organization of the firm. Agency
theory, as developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama (1980), Fama and
Jensen (1983) and Jensen (1986), has become the standard language of
corporate finance.
Agency theory studies the design of ex-ante incentive-compatible
mechanisms to reduce agency costs in the face of potential moral hazard
(malfeasance) by agents. Agency costs are defined by Jensen and Meckling
(1976, p. 308) as the sum of ‘(1) the monitoring expenditures of the principal,
(2) the bonding expenditures by the agent and (3) the residual loss’. The
residual loss represents the potential gains from trade not realized because
principals cannot provide perfect incentives for agents when the agents’ actions
are unobservable. In a typical agency model, a principal assigns an agent to do
some task (producing output, for instance), but has only an imperfect signal of
the agent’s performance (for example, effort). The agency problem resembles
the signal-extraction problem popularized in macroeconomics by Lucas (1972):
how much of the observable outcome (output) is due to the agent’s effort and
how much is due to factors beyond the agent’s control? The optimal incentive
contract balances the principal’s desire to give the agent incentives to increase
effort (for example, by basing compensation on the outcome) with the agent’s
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desire to be insured from the fluctuations in compensation that come from these
factors beyond his control.
In the agency literature, the firm itself is not the subject of attention.
According to Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976),
the ‘firm’ is simply a convenient label for the collection of contracts between
owners and managers, managers and employees and the firm and its customers
and suppliers. The firm is a nexus of a set of contracting relationships. ... The
firm is a legal fiction which serves as a focus for a complete process in which
the conflicting objectives of individuals ... are brought into equilibrium within
a framework of contractual relations’ (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, pp.
311-12).
The question of interest is thus the degree to which various contracts can
mitigate these conflicts; the boundary of the firm is a secondary issue.
5. Transaction Cost Economics
Transaction cost economics (TCE) represents another approach to studying
institutional arrangements. Here, the emphasis is on governing transactions.
TCE holds that all but the simplest transactions require some kind of
mechanism - what Williamson (1985) calls a governance structure - to protect
the transacting parties from various hazards associated with exchange. The
appropriate governance structure depends on the characteristics of the
transaction, so TCE implies an applied research program of comparative
contractual analysis: how do different forms of governance work in various
circumstances? For this reason, TCE (associated mainly with Williamson) is
sometimes described as the ‘governance’ branch of the NIE, as opposed to the
‘measurement’ branch (associated with Alchian and Demsetz, 1972).
The governance approach is distinguished by its emphasis on incomplete
contracts. In the transaction cost framework, economic organization imposes
costs because complex contracts are usually incomplete. A complete contract
specifies a course of action, a decision, or terms of trade contingent on every
possible future state of affairs. In the textbook model of competitive general
equilibrium, all contracts are assumed to be complete. The future is not known
with certainty, but the probability distributions of all possible future events are
known (what Knight, 1921, would call ‘risk’ rather than ‘uncertainty’). In an
important sense, the model is ‘timeless’: all relevant future contingencies are
considered in the ex ante contracting stage, so there are no decisions to be made
- no actions to be taken at all, really - as the future plays itself out.
TCE relaxes this assumption and holds that all complex contracts are
unavoidably incomplete. In a world of ‘true’ uncertainty, the future holds
genuine surprises and this limits the available contracting options. In simple
transactions - for instance, procuring an off-the-shelf component - uncertainty
may be relatively unimportant and spot-market contracting works well. For
more complex transactions, such as the purchase and installation of specialized
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equipment, a more sophisticated contract is needed. However, such a contract
will typically be incomplete - it will provide remedies for only some possible
future contingencies. One example is a relational contract, an agreement that
describes shared goals and a set of general principles that govern the
relationship (Goldberg, 1980). Another is an implicit contract - an agreement
that while unstated, is assumed to be understood by all sides.
Williamson attributes contractual incompleteness to cognitive limits or
‘bounded rationality’, following Simon’s (1961, p. xxiv) interpretation of
human action as ‘intendedly rational, but only limitedly so’. Other NIE
economists are more agnostic, assuming only that some quantities or outcomes
are unobservable (or not verifiable to third parties, such as the courts), in which
case contracts cannot be made contingent on these variables or outcomes.
Specific Investments and the Holdup Problem
Contractual incompleteness exposes the contracting parties to certain risks.
Primarily, if circumstances change unexpectedly, the original governing
agreement may no longer be effective. The need to adapt to unforeseen
contingencies constitutes an additional cost of contracting; failure to adapt
imposes what Williamson (1991a) calls ‘maladaptation costs’. The
most-often-discussed example of maladaptation is the ‘holdup’ problem
associated with relationship-specific investments. Investment in such assets
exposes agents to a potential hazard: If circumstances change, their trading
partners may try to expropriate the rents accruing to the specific assets.
Suppose an upstream supplier tailors its equipment for a particular customer.
After the equipment is in place, the customer may demand a lower price,
knowing that the salvage value of the specialized equipment is lower than the
net payment it offers. This creates an underinvestment problem: Anticipating
the customer’s behavior, the supplier will be unwilling to install the custom
machinery without protection for such a contingency, even if the specialized
technology would make the relationship more profitable for both sides.
One way to safeguard rents accruing to specific assets is vertical (or lateral)
integration, where a merger eliminates any adversarial interests. Less extreme
options include long-term contracts (Joskow, 1985, 1987, 1988, 1990), partial
ownership agreements (Pisano, Russo and Teece, 1988; Pisano, 1990), or
agreements for both parties to invest in offsetting relationship-specific
investments (Heide and John, 1988). Overall, several governance structures
may be employed. TCE holds that parties tend to choose the governance
structure that best controls the underinvestment problem, given the particulars
of the relationship.
The holdup problem is the best-known example of a contractual hazard.
More generally, contractual difficulties can arise from several sources: ‘(1)
bilateral dependence; (2) weak property rights; (3) measurement difficulties
and/or oversearching; (4) intertemporal issues that can take the form of
disequilibrium contracting, real-time responsiveness, long latency and strategic
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abuse; and (5) weaknesses in the institutional environment’ (Williamson,
1996b, p. 14). Each of these has the potential to impose maladaptation costs.
Foreseeing this possibility, agents seek to reduce the potential costs of
maladaptation by matching the appropriate governance structure with the
particular characteristics of the transaction.
In this way, TCE may be considered the study of alternative institutions of
governance. Its working hypothesis, as expressed by Williamson (1991c, p. 79),
is that economic organization is mainly an effort to ‘align transactions, which
differ in their attributes, with governance structures, which differ in their costs
and competencies, in a discriminating (mainly, transaction cost economizing)
way’. Simply put, TCE tries to explain how trading partners choose, from the
set of feasible institutional alternatives, the arrangement that protects their
relationship-specific investments at the least cost.
Institutions as Governance Structures
Transactions differ in several ways: the degree to which relationship-specific
assets are involved, the amount of uncertainty about the future and about other
parties’ actions, the complexity of the trading arrangement and the frequency
with which the transaction occurs. Each matters for the preferred institution of
governance, although the first - asset specificity - is particularly important.
Williamson (1985, p. 55) defines asset specificity as ‘durable investments that
are undertaken in support of particular transactions, the opportunity cost of
which investments is much lower in best alternative uses or by alternative users
should the original transaction be prematurely terminated’. This could describe
a variety of relationship-specific investments, including both specialized
physical and human capital, along with intangibles such as R&D and
firm-specific knowledge or capabilities.
Governance structures can be described along a spectrum, with ‘market’
and ‘hierarchy’ at the poles. At one end lies the pure anonymous spot market,
which suffices for simple transactions such as basic commodity sales. Market
prices provide powerful incentives for exploiting profit opportunities and
market participants are quick to adapt to changing circumstances as
information is revealed through prices. When relationship-specific assets are
at stake, however and when product or input markets are thin, bilateral
coordination of investment decisions may be desirable and combined ownership
of these assets may be efficient. At the other end of the spectrum from the
simple, anonymous spot market thus lies the fully integrated firm, where
trading parties are under unified ownership and control. TCE posits that such
hierarchies offer greater protection for specific investments and provide
relatively efficient mechanisms for responding to change where coordinated
adaptation is necessary. Compared with decentralized structures, however,
hierarchies provide managers with weaker incentives to maximize profits and
normally incur additional bureaucratic costs. Between the two poles of market
and hierarchy are a variety of ‘hybrid’ modes, such as complex contracts and
partial ownership arrangements. The movement from market to hierarchy thus
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entails a tradeoff between the high-powered incentives and adaptive properties
of the market and the safeguards and central coordinating properties of the
firm.
The general theoretical framework of TCE is now sufficiently accepted to
have been incorporated in several textbook treatments (Kreps, 1990, pp.
744-90; Rubin, 1990; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Acs and Gerlowski, 1996;
and Besanko, Dranove and Shanley, 1990).
6. Capabilities and the Core Competence of the Firm
An alternative approach to explaining institutional arrangements focuses on the
‘core competence’ or ‘capabilities’ of the firm. The capabilities view, which
traces its roots to Alfred Marshall and Joseph Schumpeter, was first stated
explicitly by Edith Penrose in her Theory of the Growth of the Firm (1959). It
has been developed further by Teece (1980, 1982) and by Nelson and Winter
in their Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (1982). The capabilities
view regards the firm not as a nexus of contracts (as in Alchian and Demsetz,
1972), or as a set of residual control rights (as in Grossman and Hart, 1986),
but as a stock of knowledge. The firm’s capabilities depend on the tacit
knowledge it contains, as manifested in organizational memory or routines.
This knowledge is considered technologically inseparable; it is firm-specific,
not transaction-specific and thus helps determine the boundary of the firm
(Chandler, 1992). In this sense, ‘firms exist because they are superior
institutional arrangements for accumulating specialized productive knowledge,
quite independently of considerations of opportunism, incentive alignment and
the like’ (Foss, 1996, p. 2).
In the field of strategic management, organizational capabilities have been
examined from within the ‘resource-based’ view of the firm. In the
resource-based view, competitive advantage comes from having unique factors
of production, resources that are not easily imitable or transferable (and thus
cannot be purchased in factor markets). Excess profits or supranormal returns
are seen as rents accruing to these unique resources (Rumelt, 1984; Wernerfelt,
1984). Firm-specific resources may include organizational capabilities,
managerial skill, technological innovation and reputational capital. When firms
have excess capacity in these unique factors, they expand and diversify into
product lines whose manufacture employs similar capabilities or routines. The
resource-based view is thus concerned as much about economic change, or
‘evolution’, as it is about the design and use of optimal contracts. For this
reason, the capabilities approach is often associated with the ‘evolutionary’
theory of the firm. (See Langlois and Robertson, 1995, for an overview.)
The capabilities perspective is intriguing and offers many useful insights
into firm organization and behavior. However, research in this area often
proceeds at a very high level of abstraction. While there have been several
applied studies (Kogut and Chang, 1991; Langlois and Robertson, 1989;
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Langlois, 1992a, 1992b; Teece et al., 1994; Argyres, 1996) further empirical
work is needed to develop the economics of firm capabilities.
7. Evidence on Contracts, Organizations and Institutions
The same criticism has been leveled at the theory of the firm more generally.
Simon (1991, p. 27), for example, has charged the new institutional economics
and transaction cost economics in particular, with lacking sufficient empirical
support. Until the relevant empirical studies have been done, he says, ‘the new
institutional economics and related approaches are acts of faith, or perhaps of
piety’. However, much empirical work has already been carried out. (Shelanski
and Klein, 1995, provide a comprehensive survey; Masten, 1996, collects many
of the important articles.) On balance, a remarkable amount of this empirical
work is consistent with TCE - much more so, perhaps, than is the case with
most of industrial organization (Joskow, 1991, p. 81). As Williamson (1996a,
p. 55) puts it: ‘TCE is an empirical success story’.
Much of the empirical research in TCE follows the same basic model. The
efficient form of organization for a given economic relationship - and,
therefore, the likelihood of observing a particular organizational form or
governance structure - is a function of certain properties of the underlying
transaction or transactions: asset specificity, uncertainty, complexity and
frequency. Organizational form is the dependent variable, while asset
specificity, uncertainty, complexity and frequency are independent variables.
Specifically, the probability of observing a more integrated governance
structure depends positively on the amount or value of the relationship-specific
assets involved and, for significant levels of asset specificity, on the degree of
uncertainty about the future of the relationship, on the complexity of the
transaction and on the frequency of trade.
Empirical work in TCE implicitly assumes that market forces work to cause
an ‘efficient sort’ between transactions and governance structures, so that
exchange relationships observed in practice can be explained in terms of
transaction cost economizing. Williamson (1988, p. 174) acknowledges this,
while recognizing that the process of transaction cost economizing is not
automatic:
The [transaction cost] argument relies in a general, background way on the efficacy
of competition to perform a sort between more and less efficient modes and to shift
resources in favor of the former. This seems plausible, especially if the relevant 
outcomes are those that appear over intervals of five and ten years rather than in the
very near term. This intuition would nevertheless benefit from a more fully
developed theory of the selection process. Transaction cost arguments are thus open
to some of the same objections that evolutionary economists [for example, Nelson
and Winter] have made of orthodoxy.
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Still, he maintains that the efficiency presumption is reasonable, offering
the argument - analogous to Friedman’s famous (1953) statement on the
selection process - that inefficient governance arrangements will tend to be
discovered and undone. Concerning vertical integration, for example,
Williamson (1985, pp. 119-20) writes that ‘backward integration that lacks a
transaction cost rationale or serves no strategic purposes will presumably be
recognized and will be undone’, adding that mistakes will be corrected more
quickly ‘if the firm is confronted with an active rivalry’. Silverman, Nickerson
and Freeman (1997) have shown that transaction cost efficiency is positively
correlated with firm survival in the for-hire trucking industry, though evidence
from other industries is scant.
Despite such concerns, most empirical literature inspired by TCE takes as
given an economizing framework, assuming that we can draw inferences about
the efficiency of organizational forms by observing what organizations actually
do. Unlike earlier traditions in industrial organization, which presumed that
complex contracts and similar deviations from perfect competition are usually
attempts to gain monopoly power, TCE follows the common-law presumption
that such contracts ‘serve affirmative economic purposes’ (Williamson, 1985,
p. 200). Furthermore, such contracts are objectionable only if some feasible
alternative exists (Coase, 1964).
Organizational form is often modeled as a binary variable - ‘make’ or ‘buy’,
for example - though it can sometimes be represented by a continuous variable.
Of the independent variables, asset specificity is the most difficult to measure.
Williamson (1991a) distinguishes among six types of asset specificity. The first
is site specificity, in which parties are in a ‘cheek-by-jowl’ relationship to
reduce transportation and inventory costs and assets are highly immobile. The
second, physical asset specificity, refers to relationship-specific equipment and
machinery. The third is human asset specificity, describing transaction-specific
knowledge or human capital, achieved through specialized training or
learning-by-doing. The fourth is brand-name capital, reflected in intangible
assets reflected in consumer perceptions. The fifth is ‘dedicated assets’,
referring to substantial, general-purpose investments that would not have been
made outside a particular transaction, the commitment of which is necessary
to serve a large customer. The sixth is temporal specificity, describing assets
which must be used in a particular sequence.
Among the common empirical proxies for asset specificity are component
‘complexity’, qualitatively coded from survey data, as a proxy for physical asset
specificity (Masten, 1984); worker-specific knowledge, again coded from
survey data, as a proxy for human asset specificity (Monteverde and Teece,
1982); physical proximity of contracting firms, as a proxy for site specificity
(Joskow, 1985, 1987, 1988, 1990; Spiller, 1985); and R&D expenditure, as a
proxy for physical asset specificity. Other proxies, such as fixed costs or ‘capital
intensity’, have more obvious limitations and are rarely used.
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Vertical Integration
Vertical integration, or the ‘make-or-buy’ decision, was the first topic studied
extensively within the TCE framework. Traditionally, economists viewed
vertical integration as an attempt to earn monopoly rents by gaining control of
input markets or distribution channels. But in the early 1980s a few authors
began to investigate transaction-cost (that is, efficiency) rationales for vertical
integration. Monteverde and Teece (1982) made one of the first systematic
efforts to test a contractual interpretation of vertical integration. They examined
the effects of asset specificity, defined as worker-specific knowledge or
‘applications engineering effort’, on the decision to produce components
in-house or to obtain them from outside suppliers. They found applications
engineering effort to be a statistically significant determinant of backwards
integration. The results are consistent with case-study evidence from
Globerman (1980) on firm-specific technical knowledge and integration in the
Canadian telecommunications industry. Globerman studied evidence from
public hearings and found a tendency toward common ownership of telephone
lines and equipment as the research and development demands of a carrier on
its equipment suppliers become more complex and uncertain and require more
relationship-specific investments.
Other studies of component procurement have found similar support for
transactional explanations of vertical relationships. Two studies by Walker and
Weber (1984, 1987) focus on uncertainty as a determinant of vertical
integration in the auto industry. Like Monteverde and Teece, they worked with
a list of automobile components, coded as made or bought, as the dependent
variable. They found that greater uncertainty about production volume raises
the probability that a component is made in-house, but that ‘technological
uncertainty’, measured as the frequency of changes in product specification and
the probability of technological improvements, has little effect. Their second
(1987) study included measures of market competition, testing the interactive
effects of both uncertainty in production and competition among suppliers and
added the qualification that volume uncertainty matters only when supply
markets are thin.
In a further refinement, Masten, Meehan and Snyder (1989) distinguished
among types of specific assets, comparing the relative importance of
relationship-specific human and physical capital. They also studied automobile
component production, finding that engineering effort, as a proxy for human
asset specificity, appears to affect the integration decision more than physical
or site specificity. Klein (1988), in a discussion of the G.M.-Fisher Body case,
also suggests that specific human capital in the form of technical knowledge
was a major determinant of G.M.’s decision to buy out Fisher.
The relationship between G.M. and Fisher Body in the 1920s is a frequently
discussed application of TCE. Both Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) and
Williamson (1985, pp. 114-15) explain G.M.’s buyout of Fisher in terms of the
specific physical assets that accompanied the switch from wooden- to
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metal-bodied cars. The account in Klein (1988) is somewhat different,
emphasizing specific human capital. Langlois and Robertson (1989) also
criticize the earlier TCE account of the G.M.-Fisher relationship, arguing that
systemic uncertainty, rather than asset specificity, accounts for the failure of
long-term contracting there. Helper, MacDuffie and Sabel (1997) propose
another alternative: G.M. acquired Fisher to promote collaborative learning,
not to avoid hold-up. Obviously, this case continues to stimulate interest.
Other studies have documented a similar link between integration and
R&D, which usually involves specific human capital (Armour and Teece, 1980;
Joskow, 1985; Pisano, 1990). Site specificity, dedicated assets and the need for
specifically tailored products or production facilities have been shown to
increase vertical integration in a variety of industries, including electricity
generation (Joskow, 1985), aerospace (Masten, 1984), aluminum (Stuckey,
1983; Hennart, 1988), forestry (Globerman and Schwindt, 1986), chemicals
(Lieberman, 1991) and offshore oil gathering (Hallwood, 1991).
These papers are case studies of particular industries or production
processes. As such, they avoid the problem of inconsistent measurement across
industries, but have measurement difficulties of their own. The classification
of dichotomous variables like ‘make-or-buy’, for example, is typically based on
survey data, requiring more discretion by the researcher than economists are
comfortable with. Nonetheless, most of the empirical work in TCE on vertical
integration has been of this type. While generalizing the results is of course
difficult, the cumulative evidence from different studies and industries is quite
consistent with the basic theory. Also, there do exist some cross-sectional
studies on transactional determinants of vertical integration using
multi-industry data and most have been supportive (Levy, 1985; MacMillan,
Hambrick and Pennings, 1986).
Long-term Contracts and ‘Hybrid’ Forms
Long-term contracts can be interpreted as intermediate or ‘hybrid’ forms of
organization, neither market nor hierarchy. A series of papers by Joskow (1985,
1987, 1988, 1990) investigates the effects of asset specificity on contract
duration and price adjustment in agreements between coal suppliers and
coal-burning electrical plants. He examined a large sample of coal contracts
and found that contracts tended to be longer, all else equal, when
relationship-specific investments (here, site specificity and dedicated assets) are
at stake. Crocker and Masten (1988) found the same result for the natural gas
industry. More generally, they argue that efficient contract duration depends on
the costs of contracting; contract terms become shorter, for example, as
uncertainty increases. Goldberg and Erickson (1987) analysed contracts for
petroleum coke and concluded that many provisions of the contracts can best
be interpreted as efforts by the parties to protect themselves against
expropriation of specialized investments. Other relevant studies on natural gas
contracts have been done by Crocker and Masten (1991) and Hubbard and
Weiner (1991).
474 New Institutional Economics 0530
DeCanio and Frech (1993) tried to measure more precisely the efficiency
gains from long-term contracts in natural gas. Relationship-specific
investments are critical for transactions between wellhead owners and
pipelines. For that reason, ‘take-or-pay’ contracts, in which the buyer must pay
for some minimum quantity even if delivery is not taken, are often used to
safeguard against buyer (pipeline) opportunism. In 1987, the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) outlawed take-or-pay contracts. The authors
used data from before and after the FERC order to test its effect on spot gas
prices and prices at the wellhead. They found that FERC’s interference with
parties’ ability to craft long-term governance mechanisms raised natural gas
prices between 21 percent and 31 percent in the year following FERC’s order.
The results support TCE explanations for the relative efficiency of long-term
contracts where asset specificity is required, while representing an effort to
quantify that efficiency gain. (Mulherin, 1986, and Masten and Crocker, 1985,
also examine ‘take-or-pay’ contracts.)
Another hybrid form of organization is a partial ownership agreement or
‘equity linkage’. Pisano (1990) asks why firms may rely on equity linkages
instead of contracts to support certain transactions. He argues that partial
ownership will dominate contractual governance when a relationship involves
uncertainty, transaction-specific capital and other variables. He hypothesizes
that equity linkages are more likely when R&D is to be done during
collaboration and when collaboration encompasses multiple projects and less
likely when there are more potential collaborators. His study of collaborative
arrangements in the biotechnology industry supported all these claims. Pisano,
Russo and Teece (1988) applied a similar analysis to the telecommunications
equipment business and found that the same basic framework can explain the
choice between equity linkages and other forms of cooperative ventures (joint
ventures, consortiums, or other non-equity linkages).
Allen and Lueck (1993) studied ‘cropshare’ contracts between farmers and
landowners. Such contracts specify sharing rules for both inputs and outputs;
in doing so, they pool enforcement costs by making both the farmer and the
landowner residual claimants. This reduces the farmer’s incentive to deplete
the capital value of the soil. Allen and Lueck show that optimal sharing rules
will involve either full payment of inputs by farmers or sharing input costs in
proportion to the output-sharing rule. Nee (1992) studied hybrid governance
structures in China’s transitional economy such as small, family-owned firms
run by peasant entrepreneurs (‘cadre-entrepreneurs’) and collectively owned
enterprises leased to private operators (‘marketized firms’). On hybrids see also
Gallick (1984), Masten and Snyder (1993), Lafontaine and Masten (1995) and
Menard (1996).
Informal Agreements
Like other parts of the new institutional economics, TCE pays special attention
to the importance of private solutions to resolve disputes, in contrast to the
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older tradition of legal centralism. Several studies have investigated whether
informal trade arrangements, which are not legally enforceable, may also be
motivated by the desire to make exchange more efficient. Important work in
this area has been done by Palay (1984, 1985). In two closely related papers,
Palay studied the role of informal, legally unenforceable agreements between
rail-freight carriers and shippers. He argues that ICC regulation of the industry,
which prohibits vertical integration of carriers and shippers, was geared to
‘classical contracting’ (Macneil, 1978) but is inappropriate for transactions
requiring more complex agreements. Shipment of items like automobile parts
and chemicals, for example, requires specially designed rail cars and equipment
that cannot be easily redeployed for other uses. Palay claims that informal
agreements, substituting for combined ownership, would emerge both to
encourage and to protect these relationship-specific investments. Furthermore,
he argues that the underlying characteristics of a transaction predict whether
it will be supported by an informal agreement. Evidence from case studies of
shipper-carrier transactions reveals a pattern of informal agreements highly
consistent with TCE. Equipment tailored for particular users - custom carrier
racks for automobile parts, tank and covered hopper cars for specific volatile
chemicals, and so on - was owned by individual shippers. For more
standardized shipments, these would be owned by rail carriers. The informal
agreements also provided handling procedures for unusual circumstances
related to shipment. The transactions that did not use informal contracting all
involved non-specialized capital such as standard box cars. All of this suggests
the importance of asset specificity for complex contracting.
Two studies of New England fishing industries also examined the role of
transaction costs in determining trade agreements and market structure. Wilson
(1980) conducted an intensive study of the New England fresh-fish market. He
found that underlying the smooth functioning of the market was a system of
mutual dependence created by the particular trade arrangements there;
reputation effects provided an enforcement mechanism. Acheson’s (1985) study
of the Maine lobster market reached similar conclusions, finding the lobster
market to be characterized by long-term, informal relationships between
fishermen and lobster-pound operators. Fisherman and pound operators
typically crafted agreements to reduce the costs of information and the
possibility of opportunistic use of informational asymmetries. The agreements
were reinforced by reputation considerations and interdependencies arising
from sharing scarce resources, such as market information, boat fuel and bait.
Informal agreements and norms in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century whaling
have been studied similarly by Ellickson (1989) and Gifford (1993).
Finally, in an interesting application of TCE to the context of personal
relationships, Brinig (1990) employed transaction cost reasoning to explain the
sudden increase in the demand for diamond engagement rings in the
mid-1930s. The increase, she argues, can be traced to the abolition in several
states of the ‘breach of promise to marry action’ around the same time. Before
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this action was abolished, a broken engagement could trigger a lawsuit, because
a woman in this situation faced considerable loss of reputation. Once the cause
of action was eliminated, however, another arrangement was needed to ensure
the credibility of the marriage commitment. Diamond engagement rings filled
that role. In this way, rings may be seen as a governance structure: They
safeguard the future bride’s relationship-specific investment - her good
reputation.
Franchise Contracting
Williamson’s (1976) case study of the Oakland, California Cable TV (CATV)
franchise was an early empirical study using transactional reasoning.
Responding to the Posner-Demsetz argument that competitive bidding for
monopoly franchises would result in competitive prices, Williamson claimed
that once idiosyncratic investments are in place, what was a large-numbers
bargaining situation during the bidding process is transformed into a bilateral
monopoly. Because of this change, the terms of the original contract may no
longer be suitable. Williamson outlined the difficulties faced by Oakland in the
early 1970s over its CATV franchise. The franchise was awarded to the lowest
bidder in 1970. After the franchise was awarded, however, the construction
process went more slowly than expected, fewer households signed up than
predicted and costs escalated. Consequently, the franchisee requested a
renegotiation of the contract. A complex dual-source agreement was eventually
reached, but this outcome was far different from that specified in the initial
agreement.
Two later studies of CATV have looked for similar problems, with mixed
results. Zupan (1989) examined a series of public cable franchise agreements,
comparing the terms of trade struck during the original franchise agreement
with those prevailing at the time of renewal, after relationship-specific
investments had been made; he found no significant differences in those terms.
Prager (1990), however, found that opportunistic behavior by the franchisee,
as perceived by cable customers, was higher for franchises awarded through
competitive bidding.
Of course, it is not always the franchisee who is opportunistic; the
franchiser may be as well. Grandy’s (1989) examination of nineteenth-century
railroad regulation in New Jersey found that the railroads in that state were
willing to make large specialized investments only when they were protected
by ‘special corporation charters’ limiting state action against them. Levy and
Spiller’s (1994) comparative study of telecommunications regulation in
Argentina, Chile, Jamaica, the Philippines and the UK shows that private
investment is forthcoming only when regulators can commit not to pursue
arbitrary administrative actions. Furthermore, many private franchise contracts
can also be explained through TCE (Norton, 1989; Dnes, 1992).
Besides these contractual phenomena, TCE has been brought to bear on
such diverse topics as labor market contracts and regulation (Barker and
Chapman, 1989), tie-ins and ‘block booking’ (Kenney and Klein, 1983),
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international trade and the multinational corporation (Yarbrough and
Yarbrough, 1987; Gatignon and Anderson, 1988; Hennart, 1989; Klein, Frazier
and Roth, 1990), company towns and company stores (Fishback, 1986, 1992),
land tenure agreements (Roumasset and Uy, 1980; Alston and Higgs, 1982;
Alston, Datta and Nugent, 1984; Datta, O’Hara and Nugent, 1986) and even
indentured prostitution (Ramseyer, 1991). These and other ‘non-standard’
contracting practices, when viewed through a transaction cost lens, often turn
out to have efficiency properties, particularly in offering safeguards for specific
investments.
Is the Empirical Evidence Reliable?
The discussion here presents only a sampling of the empirical literature on
contracts, organizations and institutions (see the Appendix to Shelanski and
Klein, 1995, for a more complete list). While the vast majority of these studies
are consistent with transaction cost reasoning, some difficulties remain. Besides
the measurement difficulties discussed above, empirical research on the
institutions of governance is often hampered by confusion about the definitions
of and therefore the empirical proxies for, key variables, especially uncertainty.
Asset specificity has been more successfully treated in the empirical literature;
relationship-specific physical, site and human capital investments have all been
studied, both independently and comparatively. However, further refinement
and analysis need to be done here, particularly concerning measurement.
Proxies such as capital intensity or fixed costs are very imperfect and may not
capture whether the investment has value outside the transaction for which it
was initially made. Another concern is that asset-specificity effects may be
confused with market power. While specific investment may lead to bilateral
monopoly, a small-numbers bargaining situation is not by itself evidence of
relationship-specific investment.
Besides these difficulties of measurement and definition, empirical research
on the institutions of governance is also subject to the problem found in
empirical work generally: alternate hypotheses that could also fit the data are
rarely stated and compared. Usually, the data are found only consistent or
inconsistent with the hypothesis at hand. Undoubtedly, studies that explicitly
compare competing, observationally distinct hypotheses about contractual
relationships are needed, because rival theories commonly posit mutually
exclusive outcomes. One example is Spiller’s (1985) comparison of
asset-specificity and market-power explanations for vertical mergers,
explanations that have rival predictions about the size of the gains from
mergers under various competitive conditions. Another prototype for such a
project might be MacDonald’s (1985) cross-sectional study of vertical
integration, which incorporated elements of both TCE and Stigler’s theory of
the vertical ‘life-cycle’ of the firm (though it did not attempt to distinguish
between them). Poppo and Zenger (1997) compare transaction-cost and
resource-based explanations for the make-or-buy decision, finding greater
empirical support for the former.
478 New Institutional Economics 0530
A more general concern is that most of the empirical studies discussed here
establish correlations, not causal relations, between asset specificity and
internal governance. These studies typically test a reduced-form model where
the probability of observing a more hierarchical form of governance increases
with the degree of relationship-specific investments. Plausibly, if the presence
of such investments reduces the costs of internal organization, then asset
specificity could lead to integration, independent of the holdup problem or
other maladaptation costs (Masten, 1994, p. 10). Masten, Meehan and Snyder
(1991) attempt to distinguish these two effects in the context of human capital.
They find that specific human capital investments appear to reduce internal
governance costs more than they increase market governance costs. Further
studies of this type would be valuable in assessing the implications of the
evidence for the reduced-form version of the basic theory. However, we do not
yet have a general theory of how relationship-specific assets might reduce the
costs of internal organization. By contrast, the underinvestment problem
associated with specific assets and market governance is fairly well understood.
8. Public Policy Implications and Influence
Theoretical and empirical research in the NIE has strong implications for
antitrust, regulation and other aspects of public policy. This is particularly true
for the studies of institutional arrangements discussed in the previous section.
A basic conclusion of transaction cost economics is that vertical mergers, even
when there are no obvious technological synergies, may enhance efficiency by
reducing governance costs. Hence Williamson (1985, p. 19) takes issue with
what he calls the ‘inhospitality tradition’ in antitrust - namely, that firms
engaged in non-standard business practices like vertical integration, customer
and territorial restrictions, tie-ins, franchising, and so on, must be seeking
monopoly gains. In the ten years between the celebrated Schwinn (1967) and
GTE-Sylvania (1977) cases, Williamson argues, economists began to
incorporate transaction cost considerations into their understanding of vertical
restrictions. This change in the intellectual climate was reflected in the
Supreme Court’s reversal in GTE-Sylvania of its earlier position that vertical
restraints are necessarily anticompetitive.
Joskow (1991, pp. 79-80) points out that this change may reflect sensitivity
to claims that vertical integration and restraints need not reduce competition,
rather than to claims that such arrangements provide contractual safeguards.
While the NIE argued that nonstandard business practices may reduce
transaction costs, Chicago-school writers like Posner, Peltzman and Bork were
maintaining that such practices do not necessarily result in reduced
competition. Of course, these arguments are largely complementary. Moreover,
the Chicago position on vertical restraints relies largely (though not explicitly)
on transaction-cost reasoning (Meese, 1997). In this sense, NIE has played an
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important role in recent changes in antitrust enforcement, even if its
contribution has not always been recognized.
NIE and transaction cost economics in particular, also has direct
implications for many other contracting practices and regulations, though it
does not yet appear to have influenced those areas. Barker and Chapman (1989)
argue, for example, that closed-shop agreements in labor markets may serve to
protect workers’ job-specific training rather than to exploit a monopoly
position. They attack New Zealand’s ‘blanket coverage clause’, which
effectively prohibits the closed shop, supporting their claims with arguments
based on TCE. Studies of optimal contract design such as Crocker and
Reynolds’s (1993) examination of Air Force procurement contracts are also
relevant as a guide to public policy toward government purchases of goods and
services. Other contracts between government agencies and private firms, such
as franchise contracts for the provision of public utilities (like cable TV), can
be evaluated using TCE reasoning. TCE also points out how the potential for
opportunism by the state affects private incentives to make specific investments
(Levy and Spiller, 1994). This is particularly important for economic and
political reform in the former communist countries, where the need to provide
incentives for private investment is paramount.
9. Summary
Speaking of Lionel Robbins’s influential Nature and Significance of Economic
Science (1932), Coase (1992, p. 714) remarked that ‘in Robbins’s view, an
economist does not interest himself in the internal arrangements within
organizations but only in what happens on the market’. Even Coase himself
believed, as late as 1988, that ‘[w]hy firms exist, what determines the number
of firms, what determines what firms do ... are not questions of interest to most
economists’ (Coase, 1988, p. 5). 
Today, this is clearly no longer the case. The preceding survey provides a
brief (and admittedly unbalanced) sketch of the new institutional economics.
The literature in NIE is expanding rapidly and gaining increasing adherents
and influence in economics, political science, law, strategy, sociology, growth
and development, history and other disciplines. It is a highly diverse field and
its many branches are rich in theoretical insight, relevant for policy and
empirically useful.
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